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Summary: The paper explores the significance of rhetorical argumentation
in Petr Kropotkin’s treatise Mutual Aid. A Factor of Evolution (1902). It
argues that Kropotkin’s work is steeped in the tradition of a rhetoric of sci-
ence that is profoundly Darwinian and in which various forms of analogic
reasoning play a central role. After explaining the epistemic function of the
metaphors “struggle for existence” and “mutual aid,” the paper analyses
Kropotkin’s argumentation strategies and offers an interpretation of them
as a further development and reworking of Darwinian rhetoric.
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1. Introduction
There is a surprising gap in the extensive research literature on Russian Darwin-
ism. While the reception of Darwinism in Russia has been a subject of thorough
study by historians of science, its importance as a phenomenon of scientific rhet-
oric has attracted little attention. An important exception is Daniel P. Todes’s
Darwin without Malthus. The Struggle for Existence in Russian Evolutionary
Thought (1989). Todes’s impressive monograph tells the story of Russian Darwin-
ism in the nineteenth century by tracing various interpretations of the Malthusian
metaphor of the struggle for existence.1 Yet, metaphors are only one, however im-
portant, part of the complex rhetorical apparatus of Darwinism, and as such they
must be considered contextually, with reference to other rhetorical levels. The fact
that such studies are still lacking is especially remarkable in light of the fact that
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Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution has long been regarded as a masterpiece of
rhetoric of science.2
As a starting point for closing this gap in the study of Russian Darwinism, I
would like to explore in my paper the significance of rhetorical argumentation in
Petr Kropotkin’s treatise Mutual Aid. A Factor of Evolution (1902), one of the
most prominent interpretations of Darwin’s thought in Russian culture. Kropot-
kin’s polemical response to Thomas Henry Huxley’s article “The Struggle for Ex-
istence: A Programme” (1888) was not meant to be simply a refutation of social
Darwinism from the standpoint of the political theory of anarchism.3 It is also,
and primarily, a scientific argument in favour of a particular interpretation of
Darwin’s theory of evolution, with Kropotkin representing a stream in Russian
Darwinism that is critical of Malthus and that sees the main factor of evolution in
cooperation rather than competition between organisms. I will argue that Kropot-
kin formulates his argument in the tradition of a rhetoric of science that is pro-
foundly Darwinian and in which various forms of analogical reasoning play a dis-
tinct role. First (1) I will explain the epistemic function of the metaphors “struggle
for existence” and “mutual aid” in the context of Darwin’s and Kropotkin’s rhetor-
ical argumentation, and in doing so, I will give a short outline of the historical
and scientific context of Russian Darwinism. Following from this (2) I will ana-
lyse Kropotkin’s argumentation strategies and offer an interpretation of them as
a further development and reworking of Darwinian rhetoric based on different
forms of analogical reasoning. In this context, Darwin’s and Kropotkin’s “imagi-
nary illustrations” play a central role.
2. The Rhetoric of “Struggle for Existence” and “Mutual Aid”
There is now a wide consensus among researchers that in the late nineteenth-cen-
tury Darwinism was less about correct or mistaken interpretations of Darwin’s
theory, but more a product of discursive practices, at the core of which was Dar-
win’s rhetoric. Darwin’s “long argument”4 in On the Origin of Species (1859) has
a specific rhetorical dimension, which should be understood as a reference to
what Aristotle called “logos,” that is dialectical reasoning whose goal is to arrive at
an acceptance or rejection of a debatable thesis by determining its plausibility.
This is not rhetoric as an art of emotional persuasion in the sense of the theory of
affects with its appeal to “ethos” and “pathos” (Rhet. I, 2, 1356a). Rather, it is
a form of situated argumentation through persuasion, which – as Cha"m Perel-
man asserts – is important in “nondemonstrative” scientific discourse, where “rea-
2 On Darwin’s rhetoric of science see, among others, Young 1985; Campbell 1987; Campbell 1989;
Bulhof 1992; Pera 1994, esp. 71–88; Campbell 1990; Waters 2003; Gross 2006, esp. 81–97;
Depew 2009; Beer 2009. On rhetoric of science in general see, among others, Gross 1990; Simons
1990; Pera and Shea 1991; Pera 1994; Kitcher 1995; Nate 1996; Harris 1997; Gross and Keith
1997; Fahnestock 1999; Ceccarelli 2001; Gross 2006; Depew and Lyne 2013. For a critical reflec-
tion on rhetoric of science and some of its radical constructivist positions see McGuire and Melia
1989; McGuire and Melia 1991.
3 On this interpretation see, among others, Kinna 1995; Morland 1997, esp. 125–180; Glassman
2000; Morris 2002; Marks 2003, esp. 38–57.
4 Darwin 1872, on 404. I cite from the sixth edition of On the Origin of Species, which is the one Kro-
potkin used when working onMutual Aid.
Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch. 43 (2020): 141 – 159142
R. Nicolosi
soning is not limited to formally correct inferences or to more or less mechanical
calculations.”5
This view of rhetoric as dialectical, situated argumentation, which in nine-
teenth century England was championed by Richard Whately in his influential
Elements of Rhetoric (1828), is of key significance to Darwin’s reasoning.6 It is im-
portant to emphasise that rhetorical argumentation in Darwin’s On the Origin of
Species (1859) is complementary to the ideal of scientific reasoning postulated by
his contemporary John Herschel. Jonathan Hodge and others pointed out that
Darwin viewed his “abstract”7 as a Herschelian demonstration of common de-
scent and transmutation driven by natural selection. Thus, in order to establish
the status of natural selection as a vera causa, Darwin had to prove the existence of
transmutation by means of natural selection, the adequacy of natural selection to
produce the effects to be explained, and the responsibility of natural selection for
these effects.8 Under this interpretation, C. Kenneth Waters convincingly argued
for the centrality of Darwin’s analogy between artificial and natural selection:
“[Darwin] used artificial selection as a way of introducing his argument for the
existence of natural selection and then drew an analogy between artificial and nat-
ural selection in order to argue for the adequacy of natural selection.”9 Waters
points out that “starting with artificial selection was a smart rhetorical move” be-
cause Darwin “lured readers into his new ways of reasoning by introducing this
type of reasoning in the uncontroversial setting of breeding techniques.”10 Fur-
thermore, the analogy with artificial selection helped Darwin to explain how nat-
ural selection could cause the transmutation of species from common descents, in
the sense of the Herschelian adequacy principle. In a context where Darwin’s
knowledge of the laws governing the production and inheritance of variations was
insufficient in order to explain the genetic variability that would be necessary for
the mechanism of natural selection to work,11 analogy was essential, not inciden-
tal, to his argumentation.12
Analogical reasoning is a cornerstone of Darwin’s rhetorical argumentation,
with metaphors playing a key role: as is well known, Darwin uses not only the
metaphor of “natural selection” but also several other metaphors as, for example:
“struggle for existence,” “economy of nature,” “the branching tree of life” etc. The
primary function of these figures of speech is not to explicate the results of a well-
proven scientific insight, but to serve an as an epistemic tool.13 In Hans Blumen-
berg’s terminology, these are “absolute metaphors,” that is, “‘translations’ that
5 Perelman 1982, on 5.
6 On Whately and Darwin see Depew 2009.
7 Darwin 1872, on 1.
8 See Hodge 1977; Hodge 1992. See also Lennox 1991; Lennox 2005.
9 Kenneth 2003, on 120.
10 Ibid., on 127.
11 See Bowler 1984, esp. 156–172.
12 Kenneth 2003, on 124. See also, among others, Evans 1984; Largent 2009. For a claim to the con-
trary, arguing that the analogy between artificial and natural selection was not a crucial element of
Darwin’s reasoning, see, for example, Ruse 1979, on 172–177.
13 See Beer 2009, esp. 44–96; Young 1985, esp. 79–125; Bulhof 1992, esp. 57–91; Schnackertz
1992, esp. 26–62.
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resist being converted back into authenticity and logicality.”14 What makes Dar-
win’s metaphors and arguments by analogy so interesting from the point of view
of rhetoric of science is exactly the fact that they are assigned an epistemic role de-
spite their non-propositional character.15 Darwin intentionally makes use of poly-
semy and conceptual porousness of analogy. These features guarantee a flexibility
of argumentation that allowed Darwin to inscribe himself in the scientific dis-
course of the time and to suggest connections to the existing theories of evolu-
tion.16
For Kropotkin’s interpretation of Darwinism, just like for the reception of
Darwin in Russia in general, the metaphor of “struggle for existence” is of central
importance. The various interpretations to which this concept was subjected in
European Darwinism—from agonal competition to cooperative mutual aid—are
not attributions that retrospectively gave a rhetorical expression to a semantically
stable core of the theory. Rather, they are a result of different understandings of
a figure of speech that is, as metaphors are, by definition, semantically poly-
semous. The term “struggle for existence” was first used in An Essay on the Princi-
ple of Population (1798) by Thomas R. Malthus, one of the leading theoreticians
of classical English political economy. Malthus’s anti-utopian treatise openly tar-
geted early socialist utopias of the time, and primarily William Godwin’s Enquiry
Concerning Political Justice (1793). Malthus set out to refute Godwin’s thesis on
social progress through a redistribution of wealth and on what Godwin saw as
a related question of the organic and moral perfectibility of humans by resorting
to an argument that was already known in the political economy of his time: an
egalitarian, rapidly growing society runs the risk of collapsing as a result of over-
population.
In Malthus’s opinion there is a divine natural law that ensures a balance be-
tween “population” and “subsistence” that grow at different rates. Because of the
insurmountable sexual drive of humans, writes Malthus, “population, when un-
checked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arith-
metical ratio.”17 From this premise Malthus develops what he sees as the natural
law of necessary and regular “checks,” which hinder an increase in population.18
“Misery and vice” are the most powerful of such regulative elements, and they
mostly affect the poor.19 Combined with other scourges, such as epidemics and
hunger, “misery and vice” keep in balance the population numbers and the quan-
14 Blumenberg 2010, on 3.
15 While theoreticians of argumentation may well attribute a heuristic function to metaphor and to ar-
gument from analogy, these rhetorical devices have no validity as logical arguments. For Perelman,
for example, while analogy helps to formulate a hypothesis, it does not form part of “Ontology”
(Perelman 1982, on 115). See also Gabriel 1997. On the epistemic function of metaphors in the
scientific discourse see, among others, Ortony 1979; Bono 1990; Danneberg 1995; Baake 2003;
Brandt 2004.
16 See Depew 2009.
17 Malthus 2007, on 5.
18 Malthus distinguishes between “preventive checks,” such as conscious abstinence and late marriage,
and “positive checks,” that is, factors that increase general mortality (ibid., on 24).
19 Malthus intended his treatise to be not just a justification of the social status quo and to polemicise
against social utopias, but also a criticism of contemporary political measures aimed to alleviate
poverty. See Wrigley 2004, esp. 229–248.
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tity of food in the world.20 Malthus sees human life as a permanent “struggle for
existence”21 governed by competition and class differences, a never-ending cycle
where periods of population growth are followed by regulatory “checks” and, fi-
nally, by a decrease in population numbers.
There is a certain (unintentional) irony in the fact that Malthus’s theory of
population, grounded as it is in the conviction that the nature of socio-economic
and anthropological facts is unchangeable, was a decisive inspiration behind Dar-
win’s theory of evolution. Reading Malthus’s treatise gave Darwin an insight into
the discrepancy between an exponential growth of organisms and naturally limit-
ed resources, which “inevitably” results in a struggle for existence.22 Darwin used
the metaphor of a “struggle for existence” to define the complex relationships
both between organisms (within the same or different species) and between or-
ganisms and abiotic conditions—the relationships that drive natural selection. It
is important to stress that Darwin was well aware of the metaphorical dimension
of the term “struggle for existence.” In On the Origin of Species he writes: “I
should premise that I use this term in a large and metaphorical sense including
dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more important)
not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny.”23 As Darwin
clarifies, the metaphoric expression “struggle for existence” oscillates between a lit-
eral meaning in the sense of organisms fighting for survival, and an indirect
meaning of living creatures being dependent on each other and on the environ-
ment. In On the Origin of Species Darwin plays consciously with both semantic
layers, so that the agonal element of the struggle partly acquires the militant con-
notations of a “war of nature,”24 while the “mutual relations of all organic
beings”25 implies a state opposite to that of confrontation: a cooperation of living
beings with each other.26
As is well known, this intentional polysemantic metaphor led the readers to in-
terpret his theory in different ways.27 The Russian nineteenth-century cultural tra-
dition, in which Kropotkin’s concept of mutual aid is rooted, was critical of those
elements of the theory of evolution that were closely identified with Malthus’s
teachings: the vision of “overpopulation as the generator of conflict and of intra-
specific competition as its result.”28 By that time Malthus’s thoughts on political
economy had already been met with scepticism among Russian intelligentsia.
Most importantly, Malthus’s theory was practically incompatible with the geo-
graphic reality of Russia. It simply took too much imagination to conceive of the
possibility that a relentless struggle for limited food and space resources might
break out in this sparsely populated country. This critical reception of Malthus’s
20 Malthus 2007, on 5: “By the law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, the
effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal.”
21 Ibid., on 18.
22 Darwin 1872, on 50.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., on 61.
25 Ibid.
26 Campbell 1987, on 81.
27 See, among others, Crook 2007; Engels and Glick 2008; Glick 2014.
28 Todes 1987, on 538. See also Todes 1989; Korostelev 1978.
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ideas was also ideologically grounded, as Malthus became an embodiment of the
enemy figure for different political and ideological groups within the Russian in-
telligentsia. For example, Vladimir F. Odoevskii, a follower of Friedrich W. J.
Schelling, saw in Malthus, and in English political economy in general, manifesta-
tions of a logical analytical thinking that obstructed the idealistic path towards the
Absolute.29 For conservative and radical thinkers alike Malthus was a symbol of
inhumane individualism, preaching the principle of competition in accordance
with the British philosophy of liberal economics. To this, the Russian critics coun-
terposed the social-economic concept of a peasant commune (russ.: obshchina).30
When Darwin’s theory of evolution was translated into Russian (the first trans-
lation of On the Origin of Species appeared in 1864), the Malthusian elements in
it were almost unanimously rejected. In particular, the agonal implications in the
metaphor of a “struggle for existence” (russ.: bor’ba za sushchestvovanie) met in
Russia with little sympathy in either political discourse or in that of natural scien-
ces. Partly it was due to the fact that Darwin’s work first became known in Russia
in Heinrich G. Bronn’s German translation (1860), where the “struggle for exis-
tence” became “Kampf um’s Daseyn.”31 Nikolai Chernyshevskii, a devotee of
Godwin, remarked in 1873: “the vileness of Malthusianism has passed into Dar-
win’s doctrine.”32 Remarkably, most Russian biologists also refuted the idea of
competition between organisms as a motor of evolution. They found Darwin’s
idea of nature, in which the primary forces are overpopulation and intraspecific
competition, misleading.
Various alternative theories emerged, whose common denominator was that in
them the struggle for life was not an important factor of evolution.33 Botanist
Andrei N. Beketov represented a neo-Lamarckist position in stressing a direct in-
fluence of the environment on organisms. Botanic geographer Sergei I. Korzhin-
skii came up with a theory of heterogenesis in which he made a case for discontin-
uous variations in nature that would be incompatible with the mechanisms of
struggle for existence and natural selection. Finally, zoologist Karl F. Kessler devel-
oped a theory of “mutual aid” (russ.: vzaimnaia pomoshch’), according to which
the central element of an evolutionary struggle for life is the struggle of organisms
29 See Mann 1998, esp. 152–199. In his Russian Nights (1844) Odoevskii refers to Malthus as “the
last absurdity in mankind, […] a man who focused in himself all the crimes, all the fallacies of his
epoch, and squeezed strict and mathematically formulated laws of society out of them” (Odoevsky
1997, on 50–51).
30 For example, the westerner Aleksandr Herzen, whose ideas were supposed to provide guidance to
the Russian populists (narodniki), claimed: “The Russian peasant commune […] is the perfect an-
tithesis of Malthus’s celebrated proposition: it allows everyone without exception to take his place
at the table.” Quoted after Todes 1987, on 540. See also Leo Tolstoy’s criticism of Malthus in Tak
chto zhe nam delat’? (completed in 1886, first published in English asWhat To Do? in 1887), and of
the struggle for existence as a postulate of social Darwinism in Anna Karenina (Part 5, Chap. IX;
Part 7, Chap. XXX; Part 8, Chap. XII).
31 Kolchinskii 2006, on 179.
32 Quoted after Todes 1987, on 541. Likewise, panslavist Nikolai Ia. Danilevskii, whose Darwinism.
A Critical Investigation (Darvinizm. Kriticheskoe issledovanie, 1885–1889) became an influential
anti-Darwinist text, saw in the transfer of the utilitarian idea of competition from Malthus’s eco-
nomic theory onto the organic world the greatest weakness of Darwin’s theory of evolution. See Vu-
cinich 1988, esp. 118–150.
33 For a detailed overview of these theories see Todes 1989, esp. 45–122.
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with abiotic conditions, and not intraspecific conflict.34 For Kessler, the need for
safety and reproduction demands that organisms join forces rather than compete
with each other, and the fittest are defined by their ability to cooperate. In his
summary of Kessler’s thesis Todes writes: “Mutual aid contributed to evolution in
two ways. First, it increased the resources and life span of a species, and so the
likelihood that the direct action of the environment would create new forms; and
second, it increased the chances that these forms would prosper.”35
Kropotkin, a Russian leader of the international anarchist movement, respond-
ed enthusiastically to Keller’s ideas. Since 1876 in exile in London, he read Kess-
ler’s writings in 1883 and saw in them “a further development of the ideas ex-
pressed by Darwin himself in The Descent of Man.”36 His pamphlet Mutual Aid.
A Factor of Evolution (1902) was written as a response to Thomas H. Huxley’s
essay The Struggle for Existence: A Programme (1888), in which “Darwin’s bulldog”
(such was Huxley’s nickname) postulated that the struggle for existence was an in-
evitable feature of human life, too: “so long as the natural man increases and mul-
tiplies without restraint, so long will peace and industry not only permit, but they
will necessitate, a struggle for existence as sharp as any that ever went on under
the r8gime of war.“37 To this Malthusian vision of life Kropotkin opposes a natural
history of mutual aid which he conceptualizes as a natural instinct that is equally
shared by humans and animals. Kropotkin does not discount the significance of
struggle for life in evolution. However, in his understanding it is mostly a struggle
of organisms with abiotic factors, which often promotes mutual help:
In the animal world we have seen that the vast majority of species live in societies,
and that they find in association the best arms for the struggle for life: understood,
of course, in its wide Darwinian sense—not as a struggle for the sheer means of exis-
tence, but as a struggle against all natural conditions unfavorable to the species. The
animal species, in which individual struggle has been reduced to its narrowest limits,
and the practice of mutual aid has attained the greatest development, are invariably
the most numerous, the most prosperous, and the most open to further progress.
[…] The unsociable species, on the contrary, are doomed to decay.38
In Kropotkin’s eyes, the theory of mutual aid is a correction of a false understand-
ing of Darwinism. For him the struggle for life—just like for Darwin himself,
whom Kropotkin quotes—is to be understood “in its large and metaphorical
sense”39 rather than literally. In fact, however, Kropotkin’s reading is a more radi-
cal take on a particular semantic layer inherent in the Darwinian concept, where-
by stress is placed on an interdependence of organisms and their cooperation.
This leads to a striking proliferation of Darwinist metaphorical tropes, since the
concept “mutual aid” is but another metaphor in which social and biological reali-
ties are placed in a relationship of similarity. This metaphor is polysemous in the
34 Kessler 1880.
35 Todes 1987, on 546.
36 Kropotkin 2006, on xiii.
37 Huxley 1888, on 168.
38 Kropotkin 2006, on 242.
39 Ibid., on 1.
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same way as Darwin’s metaphor is: “mutual aid” means both “mutual protection”
and “sociability” with all implied connotations.
For Kropotkin, this rhetorical polysemy compensates for the insufficient em-
pirical rigour of his theory. His ideas are ultimately not compatible with the belief
in natural selection. Unlike intraspecific competition, mutual aid cannot be a vera
causa for an evolution of physical traits in organisms or for an emergence of new
species.40 During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Kropotkin devot-
ed numerous studies to this weak point of his theory and propagated a neo-La-
marckist vision of evolution. In this view, an unmediated influence of the envi-
ronment on organisms and an inheritance of acquired traits are direct causes of
variations, whereby cooperative species are subject to these factors more than indi-
vidualistic ones.41
In Mutual Aid these difficulties of the theory are not yet explicitly formulated.
Instead, the reader is presented with an image of animal ecology where the “Law
of Mutual Aid”42 plays a key role. Without being able to explain clearly how this
“Law” can function as a “factor of evolution,” Kropotkin resorts to providing dis-
cursive evidence for his hypothesis by means of rhetorical arguments that rely
heavily on Darwin’s own line of reasoning, made sometimes even more radical in
Kropotkin’s interpretation. In adopting Darwin’s characteristic style of argumenta-
tion and using it for his ends, Kropotkin attempts to convey the impression that
his treatise offers the correct interpretation of Darwin’s theory of evolution.
3. Kropotkin’s Darwinian Rhetoric
Kropotkin’s reliance on Darwin’s argumentative strategies is evident already in the
first sentences of the introduction to Mutual Aid, where he recounts his observa-
tions of animal life that he conducted as a naturalist while on expeditions to East-
ern Siberia and northern Manchuria in the 1860s. This is a reference to the
famous first pages of On the Origin of Species, where Darwin talks about his jour-
ney on board the HMS Beagle and his observations of the flora and fauna of
South America.43 To explicate his hypothesis on the process of evolution, Kropot-
kin phrases his personal, direct observations in a more dramatically charged form
than Darwin, drawing a vivid picture of the “struggle for existence which most
species of animals have to carry on against an inclement Nature.”44 This literary
ekphrasis of natural destruction helps make the significance of “Mutual Aid and
40 Todes 1989, on 136.
41 Girjn 2003.
42 Kropotkin 2006, on xiii.
43 Ibid, on xi: “Two aspects of animal life impressed me most during the journeys which I made in
my youth in Eastern Siberia and Northern Manchuria.” Darwin 1872, on 1: “When on board
H.M.S. ‘Beagle’, as naturalist, I was much struck with certain facts in the distribution of the inhabi-
tants of South America […].”
44 Kropotkin 2006, on xi: “The terrible snow-storms which sweep over the northern portion of Eura-
sia in the later part of the winter, and the glazed frost that often follows them; the frosts and the
snow-storms which return every year in the second half of May, when the trees are already in full
blossom and insect life swarms everywhere; the early frosts and, occasionally, the heavy snowfalls in
July and August, which suddenly destroy myriads of insects, as well as the second broods of the
birds in the prairies […].”
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Mutual Support […] for the maintenance of life, the preservation of each species
and its further evolution”45 more plausible. It is, in other words, not so much
a matter of proving the hypothesis as of illustrating it by means of rhetorical evi-
dentia, i.e. of a detailed and vivid description.
Kropotkin’s metarhetorical reflexions on the polysemic nature of the metaphor
“struggle for existence,” which carries the main argumentative weight in Mutual
Aid, are also Darwinian. However, while Darwin, as we have already seen, expli-
cates the broad semantic field that the metaphor covers, Kropotkin turns against
restricting the meaning of a “struggle for life” to a “competition between each and
all,” with the animal world seen “as a world of perpetual struggle among half-
starved individuals, thirsting for one another’s blood.”46 Kropotkin points out
that he understands the metaphor differently, and offers his own definition—
which seems just as restrictive as Darwin’s: for Kropotkin it is about “mutual sup-
port, mutual aid, mutual defence amidst animals belonging to the same species.”47
Kropotkin supports this antithetic argument through the use of a classical appella-
tive figure of speech—a rhetorical question, which, interestingly, he addresses to
nature: “But if we resort to an indirect test, and ask Nature: ‘Who are the fittest:
those who are continually at war with each other, or those who support one an-
other?’ we at once see that those animals which acquire habits of mutual aid are
undoubtedly the fittest.”48 Here Kropotkin resorts to the rhetorical device of per-
sonification (fictio personae) with respect to nature, which plays an important,
though ambiguous, role also in Darwin’s treatise.49
Kropotkin, thus, replaces the agonal implication of competition in the meta-
phor “struggle for life” through another metaphor, that of “mutual aid,” which is
just as polysemous as the Darwinian one. “Mutual aid” must be understood both
in a direct, literal sense and in an indirect, metaphoric one, as referring to cooper-
ation and sociability. As so often in Darwinism, this reframing takes place with
reference to Darwin himself as an argument from authority. Kropotkin refers to
passages in The Descent of Man (1871) where Darwin discusses sociability among
animals and humans.50 Darwin’s goal is to show that social instincts are the foun-
dation of a “moral sense,” which should allow him to postulate a continuity be-
tween animals and humans also in this respect. Understood thus, sociability can
present an evolutionary advantage: “With those animals which were benefited by
living in close association, the individuals which took the greatest pleasure in soci-
ety would best escape various dangers; whilst those that cared least for their com-
rades, and lived solitary, would perish in greater numbers.”51
For all that, Darwin is cautious in drawing conclusions. He understands coop-
eration as a phenomenon that can only be observed in groups of animals, not in
whole species. Nor does he exclude the possibility that “cooperative forms were
45 Ibid., on xii.
46 Ibid., on 2–3.
47 Ibid., on 5.
48 Ibid.
49 See Beer 2009, esp. 44–70.
50 See Darwin 2004, esp. 123–144.
51 Ibid., on 129.
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still engaged in a metaphorical struggle for existence among themselves.”52 Kro-
potkin, however, interprets Darwin’s statements as an unambiguous proof of the
centrality of mutual aid as a factor of evolution. This thesis can be supported not
so much by means of hypothetico-deductive reasoning as through a variety of fig-
ures of rhetorical argumentation clearly borrowed from Darwin. Like Darwin,
Kropotkin emphasises the inductive, Baconian nature of his theory that is based
on an “abundance of facts.”53 Together with that he must acknowledge that it is
not in all realms of organic life that mutual aid can be observed. In doing so he
makes a pragmatic move, i.e., just like Darwin, he “invites his skeptical interlocu-
tors to pursue the inquiry in order to gain future benefits,”54 linking it with an ar-
gument ad ignorantiam:
Mutual aid is met with even amidst the lowest animals, and we must be prepared to
learn some day, from the students of microscopical pond-life, facts of unconscious
mutual support, even from the life of micro-organism. Of course, our knowledge of
the life of the invertebrates, save the termites, the ants, and the bees, is extremely lim-
ited; and yet, even as regards the lower animals, we may glean a few facts of well-as-
certained cooperation.55
A further rhetorical argument that Kropotkin—just like Darwin56—readily em-
ploys is the reductio ad absurdum to the point of ridicule. An example can be
found in the beginning of chapter III, where he discusses the “absurd” notion that
humans might be the only species in whose evolution mutual support has played
no role:
It is evident that it would be quite contrary to all that we know of nature if men
were an exception to so general rule: if a creature so defenceless as man was at his be-
ginnings should have found his protection and his way to progress, not in mutual
support, like other animals, but in a reckless competition for personal advantages,
with no regard to the interests of the species. To a mind accustomed to the idea of
unity in nature, such a proposition appears utterly indefensible.57
Of all the argumentative devices he borrows from Darwin, Kropotkin accords
a central function to analogy. The metaphoric dimension of the concept of
mutual aid serves as a basis upon which Kropotkin lays out argumentation by
analogy, which, like in Darwin’s texts, establishes a relation between the semantic
fields of the biological and the social. As we have already seen, Darwin could
make the idea of natural selection plausible mainly by drawing a comparison with
the breeding of animals and cultivation of plants, as is implied in the metaphor
“natural selection.” In order to strengthen this analogy, Darwin repeatedly uses an
52 Todes 1989, on 11.
53 Kropotkin 2006, on 8.
54 Pera 1994, on 79. See also Depew 2009, esp. 243–245.
55 Kropotkin 2006, on 8.
56 See Pera 1994, on 79–80; Depew 2009, on 243–244.
57 Kropotkin 2006, on 62.
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additional argument a fortiori, also known as a double hierarchy argument, which
is a feature of analogical reasoning:58
As man can produce, and certainly has produced, a great result by his methodical
and unconscious means of selection, what may not natural selection effect? Man can
act only on external and visible characters: Nature, if I may be allowed to personify
the natural preservation or survival of the fittest, cares nothing for appearances,
except in so far as they may be useful to any being. She can act on every internal
organ, on every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life.59
Kropotkin, too, can only make his hypothesis that mutual aid is a motor of evolu-
tion plausible through an analogy between observable phenomena that character-
ise the development of humans and phenomena whose existence is presumed in
nature. Like Darwin, that is, by following the logic of analogical reasoning in con-
junction with the double hierarchy argument, Kropotkin explains, for example,
that it would be downright impossible for a keen competition to occur between
living beings in nature, and that the Malthusian principle is false, because high
mortality rates in the first months of life prevents such competition from develop-
ing:
In reality, the chief argument in favour of a keen competition for the means of exis-
tence continually going on within every animal species is – to use Professor Geddes’
expression – the “arithmetical argument” borrowed from Malthus. But this argu-
ment does not prove it at all. We might as well take a number of villages in South-
East Russia, the inhabitants of which enjoy plenty of food, but have no sanitary ac-
commodation of any kind; and seeing that for the last eighty years the birth-rate was
sixty in the thousand, while the population is now what it was eighty years ago, we
might conclude that there has been a terrible competition between the inhabitants.
But the truth is that from year to year the population remained stationary, for the
simple reason that one-third of the newborn died before reaching their sixth month
of life; one-half died within the next four years, and out of each hundred born, only
seventeen or so reached the age of twenty. The new-comers went away before having
grown to be competitors. It is evident that if such is the case with men, it is still
more the case with animals.60
The last sentence in the quote is precisely such an argument a fortiori, which
builds up an analogy between the human and the animal worlds and helps Kro-
potkin to infer (admittedly, without making a particularly convincing argument)
that keen competition in nature almost doesn’t occur. This quote also exposes an
important consequence of analogical reasoning for Kropotkin’s argument. While
Darwin is careful to contain the anthropomorphic implications of the analogy be-
tween artificial and natural selection, for which reason he “attempts to deconstruct
the mythological personage Nature”61 in later editions of On the Origin of Species,
Kropotkin is not prepared to relinquish an anthropomorphic image of the animal
58 See Pera 1994, on 77–79. On double hierarchy arguments see Perelman 1982, esp. 102–104; Fah-
nestock 1999, esp. 105–108.
59 Darwin 1872, on 65. See also ibid., on 49.
60 Kropotkin 2006, on 55.
61 Beer 2009, on 64.
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kingdom. In fact, in his version of the theory of evolution he goes even further in
anthropomorphising animals. This is understandable, since if it is true that
mutual aid and sociability are instincts that justify an anarchistic form of life
among animals and humans alike, then modern state institutions have been re-
pressing a more evolutionary advantageous form of existence. Such claim,
though, is only plausible if similar patterns of behaviour can be observed among
animals and humans. However, since Kropotkin’s understanding of mutual aid is
grounded primarily in the concept of human solidarity,62 he has no choice but to
anthropomorphise all of the animal kingdom.
In order to demonstrate that human solidarity grows from the natural instinct
of mutual aid, Kropotkin makes use of Darwin’s argumentation strategy in The
Descent of Man. When presenting his central thesis concerning the descent of
man from a “less highly organised form,”63 Darwin explores the multiple evolu-
tionary levels of each of his examples simultaneously. The readers are presented
with a rapid succession of evidence from the social and sexual life of animals,
“primitive men,” “savages” and “civilised men.” This contrasting of various evolu-
tionary stages, meant to demonstrate continuity and development at once, turns
The Descent of Man into a fascinating theatrum naturae with countless actors and
micro-stories. In Kropotkin’s text, the result is not so much the intended image of
a biological continuity between animals and men as that of anthropomorphised
social animals, who feel and act like social human beings. Of special interest in
this context are his examples of how sociability is expressed among animals when
it lacks any apparent utilitarian purpose. This makes birds into creatures that
appear to spend most of their time engaging in play and sports:
To take flights in flocks for the mere pleasure of the flight, is quite common among
all sorts of birds. […] In the Steppes of South Russia [the kestrel] is (or rather was)
so sociable that Nordmann saw them in numerous bands, with other falcons […]
coming together every afternoon about four o’clock, and enjoying their sports till
late in the night. […] In fact, it would be much easier to describe the species which
live isolated than to simply name those species which join the autumnal societies of
young birds – not for hunting or nesting purposes, but simply to enjoy life in soci-
ety and spend their time in plays and sports.64
In Kropotkin’s book animals know “friendship, […] grief and sorrow,” and devel-
op a “collective sense of justice.”65 They are further anthropomorphised by the
telling of micro-stories that provide a dynamic illustration of how mutual aid
works among them. The following example is taken from a passage where Kro-
potkin talks of “social and intelligent birds” defeating through a joint effort the at-
tacks of predators on the shores of Russian lakes in springtime:
And here are the robbers – the strongest, the most cunning ones, those ‘ideally or-
ganized for robbery.’ And you hear their hungry, angry, dismal cries as for hours in
succession they watch the opportunity of snatching from this mass of living beings
62 See, for example, Kropotkin 2006, on xvi.
63 Darwin 2004, on 676.
64 Kropotkin 2006, on 18–19, 30.
65 Ibid., on 24, 47.
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one single unprotected individual. But as soon as they approach, their presence is sig-
nalled by dozens of voluntary sentries, and hundreds of gulls and terns set to chase
the robber. Maddened by hunger, the robber soon abandons his usual precautions:
he suddenly dashes into the living mass; but attacked from all sides, he again is com-
pelled to retreat. From sheer despair he falls upon the wild ducks; but the intelligent,
social birds rapidly gather in a flock and fly away if the robber is an erne; they
plunge into the lake if it is a falcon; or they raise a cloud of water-dust and bewilder
the assailant if it is a kite.66
This vivid description is typical for Mutual Aid. Here Kropotkin switches from
the plural (“robbers”) to the singular (“robber”), whereby intelligent birds defend
themselves as a collective against an anthropomorphised lonely predator who ap-
pears as an almost mythical robber, a desperate attacker. The narrative form is
used to present an antithesis that is typical for Kropotkin’s argumentation,
namely the antithesis between “carnivores which do not associate” and “sociable
animals” that are not carnivorous.67 These and numerous other “living illustra-
tions of mutual aid”68 (in Kropotkin’s own definition) directly evoke Darwin’s
device of “imaginary illustrations,” i.e., hypothetical scenarios usually introduced
by plural imperatives such as “let us suppose…,” “let us imagine…” or “let us
take the case of…” These imaginary illustrations play a crucial role in the argu-
mentation of On The Origin of Species, especially in the section of Chapter IV
called “Illustrations of the Actions of Natural Selections, or the Survival of the Fit-
test.”69 Kropotkin does not call his illustrations “imaginary.” Instead, he stresses
that these are empirical observations of nature. Their rhetorical and literary spirit,
however, places them in an intermediary space between factuality and fictionality
where, in my opinion, Darwin’s imaginary illustrations belong, too. James G.
Lennox argues that Darwin’s imaginative narratives should be seen as thought ex-
periments designed to evaluate the explanatory potential of the theory, rather
than to provide evidence for the theory’s truth: “Darwin wants to show people
that what they think is impossible is perfectly possible.”70 Lennox also claims that
Darwin uses thought experiments as a method for disarming critics of the
theory.71 To this interpretation, I would like to add that Darwin’s hypothetical sce-
narios could be analysed also in the context of his rhetorical argumentation based
on analogy, in which they have the function of arguments by example. Here is
one of Darwin’s imaginary illustrations that Lennox analyses:
In order to make it clear how, as I believe, natural selection acts, I must beg permis-
sion to give one or two imaginary illustrations. Let us take the case of a wolf, which
preys on various animals, securing some by craft, some by strength, and some by
66 Ibid., on 27.
67 See, for example, ibid., on 31.
68 Ibid., on 28. See, for example, ibid., on 38–40.
69 Darwin 1872, on 70–76.
70 Lennox 1991, on 238.
71 Lennox 2005. Lennox shows that Darwin was inspired by Charles Lyell’s Principle of Geology
(1831) in his use of imaginary illustrations. It is also possible that another source for Darwin’s
thought experiments was Thomas R. Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population. On Malthus’s
counterfactual thought experiments see Nicolosi 2013. On thought experiments in biology see
Schlaepfer and Weber 2018.
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fleetness; and let us suppose that the fleetest prey, a deer for instance, had from any
change in the country increased in numbers, or that other prey had decreased in
numbers, during that season of the year when the wolf is hardest pressed for food.
Under such circumstances the swiftest and slimmest wolves would have the best
chance of surviving, and so be preserved or selected,—provided always that they re-
tained strength to master their prey at this or at some other period of the year, when
they might be compelled to prey on other animals.72
Lennox sees this and other imaginary illustrations as Darwin’s way to test the hy-
pothesis of natural selection as the main factor of evolution. The primary advant-
age of a fictional but plausible enactment of a scenario, in comparison with an
empirical observation, is that a careful selection of the elements that form the ex-
perimental setting makes everything rhetorically vivid. As rhetorical examples,
these imaginary illustrations are close to empirical examples: according to Aristo-
tle, from a rhetorical perspective real and fictional examples have an equal argu-
mentative value (Rhet. II, 20, 1393a). In this context, it is significant that Darwin
himself appears to discern no significant difference between fictional examples
and empirical observations. Instead, each of these two forms of exemplary think-
ing is complementary to the other one, making it more plausible. They flow into
each other and become interwoven with analogical reasoning. Thus, Darwin’s
imaginary illustration cited above is continued with yet another argument a for-
tiori, which is immediately followed by an empirical example:
I can see no more reason to doubt that this would be the result, than that man
should be able to improve the fleetness of his greyhounds by careful and methodical
selection, or by that kind of unconscious selection which follows from each man
trying to keep the best dogs without any thought of modifying the breed. I may add,
that, according to Mr. Pierce, there are two varieties of the wolf inhabiting the Cats-
kill Mountains in the United States, one with a light greyhound-like form, which
pursues deer, and the other more bulky, with shorter legs, which more frequently at-
tacks the shepherd’s flocks.73
This flowing into each other of argument by example and argument by analogy
occurs on multiple occasions in the section “Illustrations of the Actions of Natural
Selections, or the Survival of the Fittest.”74 From the point of view of rhetoric, it
is not surprising, seeing as here the examples follow the line of analogical reason-
ing rather than inductive one. Aristotle—and later Quintilian as well as Whate-
ly75—defines the example as a relation of “like to like” (Rhet. I, 2, 1357b),76 thus
suggesting a closer proximity between example and metaphor.77 In this sense,
Darwin’s imaginary illustrations help advance Darwin’s analogical reasoning that
operates through relations of similarity: from fictional examples to arguments by
analogy to empirical examples.
72 Darwin 1872, on 70–71.
73 Ibid., on 71.
74 Ibid., on 70–76.
75 Whately 1836, on 74.
76 Aristotle 1926, on 29.
77 See Willer et al. 2007, esp. 10–20; Klein 1992; Perelman 1982, esp. 106–113.
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As rhetorical examples Darwin’s imaginary illustrations have the same limited
power of persuasion as reasoning by analogy, because both can be easily refuted
through counter-examples. Rhetoric knows two main techniques of persuasion:
argumentation through enthymemes and argumentation through example. An
enthymeme is a shortened form of syllogism where appeal is made to an uncon-
troversial general principle to argue for the plausibility of a particular case. Induc-
tive reasoning by example lacks the probative force of quasi-logical enthymemes,
which is why it was seen as of secondary importance already by Aristotle (Rhet.
II, 20, 1394a). It should only be applied when no enthymeme can be proposed.
A purely illustrative example, that in a strict sense of the word is not an argumen-
tative device, can, however, be used—as Aristotle suggests—as the conclusion of
an enthymeme.
This is exactly why Darwin’s imaginary illustrations are a form of argumenta-
tion that, on the one hand, can highlight the theory’s potential explanatory
power, but on the other hand, can be easily challenged by other examples.
Lennox convincingly shows how Fleeming Jenkin in his famous review of On the
Origin of Species (1867) refutes Darwin’s arguments by making use, in his turn, of
imaginary illustrations as counter-arguments.78 Likewise, in Kropotkin’s case we
can observe a similar move. His complex text contains, next to the narrative se-
quences based on empirical observations that we discussed above, also various
imaginary illustrations. There are counterfactual scenarios where Kropotkin asks
himself, for example, what would happen if the corporative Middle Ages had
lasted longer, thus imagining an alternative development of Europe in which the
competitive individualism of modernity would have had no chance to develop.79
There are also hypothetical scenarios where Kropotkin picks Darwin’s own imagi-
nary illustrations and offers a slightly different version of them in order to dis-
prove the ideas of Darwin himself. For example, the Russian anarchist sets out to
rebut Darwin’s thesis on the evolutionary significance of a severe competition be-
tween individuals of the same species by juxtaposing an imaginary illustration to
Darwin’s argument that an absence of intermediate forms points to an “extermi-
nation of transitional varieties.” Kropotkin starts his imaginary illustration model-
ling a Darwinian hypothetical setting:
If we start from the supposition that a given area is stocked with animals to its fullest
capacity, and that a keen competition for the sheer means of existence is consequent-
ly going on between all the inhabitants—each animal being compelled to fight
against all its congeners in order to get its daily food—then the appearance of a new
and successful variety would certainly mean in many cases (though not always) the
appearance of individuals which are enabled to seize more than their fair share of the
means of existence; and the result would be that those individuals would starve both
the parental form which does not possess the new variation and the intermediate
forms which do not possess it in the same degree.80
78 See Lennox 1991, esp. 230–236. Lennox interprets these imaginary illustrations as “destructive
thought experiments” (p. 236).
81 Kropotkin 2006, on 245–246.
82 Ibid., on 52
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Kropotkin’s alteration of the Darwinian hypothetical setting consists in simply
opening up the closed area in which Darwin lets certain processes (in this case:
struggle for existence) take place. By doing so, he shows that species tend to avoid
confrontation and competition by finding a different area:
But such a combination of conditions is precisely what we do not see in Nature.
Each species is continually tending to enlarge its abode; […] and new varieties
among animals consist in an immense number of cases […] in forming new habits,
moving to new abodes, and taking to new sorts of food. In all such cases there will
be no extermination, even no competition—the new adaptation being a relief from
competition, if it ever existed; and yet there will be, after a time, an absence of inter-
mediate links, in consequence of a mere survival of those which are best fitted for the
new conditions—as surely as under the hypothesis of extermination of the parental
form.81
In this and in many other instances in Mutual Aid we can see how Kropotkin
challenges the explanatory potential of Darwinian how-possibly scenarios, altering
some elements in the hypothetical setting. In doing so, he provides counter-exam-
ples to Darwin’s imaginary illustrations, which are intended to expose weak
points of Darwin’s theory and establish Kropotkin’s version of evolutionary mech-
anisms. Seen as rhetorical examples, these scenarios are important elements of the
kind of analogical reasoning that characterises Kropotkin’s treatise—and evidence
of Kropotkin’s more radical take on Darwin’s own rhetorical devices.
These examples, though not numerous, are enough to give the reader an indi-
cation of the importance of rhetoric for Kropotkin’s argumentation. In Mutual
Aid rhetoric is not a side effect of “aesthetic narrative,”82 but a key element that
helps build up a scientific theory that should be made plausible by means of rhet-
orical devices. Mutual Aid belongs in the tradition of a Darwinian rhetoric of sci-
ence which in reference to nature is able to “discover the possible means of per-
suasion.”83 Rhetoric here is by no means divorced from the empirical dimension.
In Darwinism especially it fulfils a vital function whose importance for the Russi-
an context remains to be discovered.
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